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SUMMARY
As the trend of successful network attacks continue to rise, better forms of intrusion,
detection and prevention are needed. This thesis addresses network tra"c visualization
techniques that aid administrators in recognizing attacks. A view of port statistics and
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) alerts have been developed. Each help to address issues
with analyzing large datasets involving networks. Due to the amount of tra"c as well as
the range of possible port numbers and IP addresses, scaling techniques are necessary.
Our approach to port statistics improves upon current techniques that lack e!ectiveness
due to an overemphasis on flow, nodes, or assumed familiarity with the attack tool, causing
either late reaction or missed detection. A port-based overview of network activity pro-
duces an improved representation for detecting and responding to malicious activity. We
have found that presenting an overview using stacked histograms of aggregate port activity,
combined with the ability to drill-down for finer details allows small, yet important de-
tails to be noticed and investigated without being obscured by large, usual tra"c. We use
Georgia Tech Honeynet tra"c to test our design and show its e!ectiveness.
Another problem administrators face is the cumbersome amount of alarm data gener-
ated from IDS sensors. As a result, important details are often overlooked, and it is di"cult
to get an overall picture of what is occurring in the network by manually traversing textual
alarm logs. We have designed a novel visualization to address this problem by showing
alarm activity within a network. Alarm data is presented in an overview from which sys-
tem administrators can get a general sense of network activity and easily detect anomalies.
They additionally have the option of then zooming and drilling down for details. The
information is presented with local network IP (Internet Protocol) addresses plotted over
xii
multiple y-axes to represent the location of alarms. Time on the x-axis is used to show the
pattern of the alarms, and variations in color encode the severity and amount of alarms.
Based on our system administrator requirements study [9], this graphical layout addresses
what system administrators need to see, is faster and easier than analyzing text logs, and
uses visualization techniques to e!ectively scale and display the data. With this design, we
have built a tool that e!ectively uses operational alarm log data generated on the Georgia
Tech campus network.
For both of these systems, we describe the input data, the system design, and examples.




The expansion of network processing power and higher capacity network links have in-
creased the amount of data and information that can be exchanged over the Internet. The
Internet is the fastest growing information medium [33] in the world. Processing power is
surpassed by tra"c bandwidth speed, thereby making it easier for an attacker to get through
without being noticed [26]. With these advances also comes complexity and vulnerabilities
in networks. Tools and methods have been developed to deal with the influx of network
attacks and misuse but they are not foolproof. Network security operators are overloaded
with textual logs and interfaces using primitive graphs generated from these security ap-
pliances that prevent them from accurately determining significant problems. Quick and
accurate action is needed to e!ectively combat security issues, but the amount of data and
alerts make this impossible as often, many alerts are ignored. This decreases the value of
security appliances and leads to many successful attacks.
There are continually new vulnerabilities available to target, and there is no sign that this
trend will slow down. There are also ongoing "zero-day" exploits, those without a software
patch, that are particularly di"cult to stop. Intrusion detection systems were developed to
analyze network tra"c and alert human operators to security issues.
Research in network security using visualization shows great promise. At its core is the
innovative use of information visualization techniques to assist those who need to analyze
network data for anomalous behavior. According to Card, Mackinlay and Shneiderman,
[12] information visualization is "the use of computer-supported, interactive visual repre-
sentations of data to amplify cognition." Visualization tools are used to convey information
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from a set of data. A properly designed visual representation, as opposed to a textual rep-
resentation, allows one to understand a greater amount of data in shorter time. Researchers
in psychology have shown that humans can process pictures, a parallel process, faster than
text, a serial process. Images facilitate understanding and insights that one would not have
made if that same data were presented in other textual ways. Images are also easier to
remember because humans think and learn visually [45]. Network security visualization
helps analysts by scaling and visualizing data and facilitating the identification of patterns
in the network in order to make decisions accordingly. A prototype and tool are presented
that deals with two types of data that is analyzed for detecting network security events.
Both have been designed and use novel scaling methods to deal with processing the data
and providing e!ective visualizations. The prototype visualizes network packet statistics
and the tool visualizes alert log files over time.
Network attacks can be characterized by port activity. Though the amount of packets
is tremendous, packets can be parsed online, where real time processing can be performed
without having to wait for a flow to end to update statistics. The payload is not checked,
but with so much tra"c data, processing each packet would overburden a monitoring sys-
tem. The prototype aids in intrusion detection by visualizing network packet header data
over time. It is easy to understand, and allows those with minimal knowledge of network
security to use it e!ectively. Scaling techniques have been developed to reduce occlusion
and stacked histograms are used to e"ciently visualize the data.
Intrusion detection systems were developed to analyze network tra"c and alert human
operators to security issues. Alarms are generated when set statistical thresholds have been
reached, or when a certain sequence of events has occurred. While alarm logs are much
smaller than network tra"c capture logs, the amount generated is still large. Time wasted
by analyzing these logs can e!ectively negate the value of the system. If real attacks are
not stopped, they will generate many alarms [17]. As a result, logs can rapidly become
filled with redundant information. This fact, together with the average amount of unique
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alarms generated, can cause information overload and possibly hide the most significant
attacks [25]. To address the problem of oppressively large alert logs, we introduce a tool
that provides security system administrators with an informative, information-rich display
and a convenient interface for monitoring network security alarms as well as researching
details on a user-selected subset of those alarms.
1.1 Background
1.1.1 Data
Data that is analyzed and processed for network security comes in di!erent levels of detail
ranging from raw network packets to high level semantic information like IDS alerts [14].
Security appliances that generate this data can be IDS sensors, firewalls, servers, network
sni!ers and honeynets. Analyzing just one source of data is not enough to be fully aware
of network state. Ideally, one should look at multiple types of data, as each data source can
provide di!erent information on the activity in the network.
Two systems presented use both lower-level data, network packet headers, and high-
level data, IDS alarms. A background on these data inputs is given in the next sections.
1.1.1.1 Network Tra!c
Of the data types, raw network packets are the largest amount. They contain the actual
data and headers that traverse a network. To visualize port statistics, information needs to
be extracted from packet headers. Implementing this on a general network will consume
resources and not function e"ciently. We chose to use Georgia Tech Honeynet tra"c
for this reason. Production networks contain large percentages of legitimate tra"c, but
Honeynets are di!erent because they include primarily illegitimate or suspicious activity.
Honeynet captures are being used initially because they give a good benchmark to test
the e!ectiveness of the prototype. Analysis of Honeynet captures for forensic purposes
have been time consuming but successful in detecting worms and in finding compromised
machines on the Georgia Tech network [32]. Forensic analysis of an attack takes much of
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the analyst’s time. Any attack takes much longer to examine than it takes to occur (a few
seconds vs. a few days). Our primary goal is to lessen the time of analysis. Specifically, we
have made port activity easier to observe with our visual prototype, as opposed to reading
the packet capture text which is how forensic analysis usually occurs.
1.1.1.2 Intrusion Detection Alerts
Though the amount of alerts is much lower than that of network packets, the number of
alerts is still significant and cumbersome for network security administrators. User surveys
showed that professional security analysts can deal with more alerts than the intermedi-
ate user (eg. network security students) but 230 alerts per hour is the threshold for them
[14]. Of the 15 people surveyed who use the defacto IDS, Snort, 40% felt that there was
a learning curve getting used to using the tool and the GUI that comes with Snort. With
Snort setup on a network, Sixty percent felt that tuning the signatures was di"cult and the
signatures itself were not that e!ective in protecting the network from attacks. Forty four
percent of these people thought that tuning the IDS as to reduce false alarms and successful
attacks was di"cult.
To design a tool to visualize IDS alerts, we interviewed Georgia Tech’s Internet security
administrators and found out how they use their current IDS tools, what they look for to
determine an attack and what information is helpful. The average number of alerts on
campus is 50,000. For design and testing purposes, we used alarms generated from one
sensor that monitors the periphery of the campus network, which averages about 7,000
alarms per day. The administrators mentioned that they are overwhelmed with this amount
and with the time it takes to go through the alert logs to determine if significant events are
occurring and whether action is needed or not. We have designed the tool with this in mind
and to reduce the time of analysis.
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1.2 Contribution
Two systems have been developed to visualize two types of network data. In the process,
techniques were developed to scale and process data to enable better visualizations that
will be helpful to the users tasks. These methods could be used in other applications that
require dealing with very large amount of data in addition to multivariable data and data
with parameters of large ranges. Also, useful visualizations were designed for these data
types that can contain a lot of information as well as represent good overview, with drill
down techniques. Finally, a user study was performed to guide the design of the alarm
visualization and then when the tool was developed, it was evaluated and feedback was
given.
1.3 Thesis Organization
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: In chapter 2 we talk about related
work in the field of network visualization and security network visualization. Chapter 3
describes the data-set in more detail, along with scaling the data and parameters associated
with it, general and specific to the data we are using. Then details on the data parameters
itself are given. The design of the systems and how they function are explained in chapter
4. Common threat models are presented in chapter 5 to show how the systems are e!ective
for finding anomalous activity.
A detailed description of our user study performed to help design the IDS alarm visu-
alization and surveys performed after the tool was used is discussed in chapter 6.




2.1 Visualization and Network Security
Original work in network visualization was done as a map layout to understand network
link behavior. Network layout methods have also been used in conjunction with network
security. Other data sources visualized are network flow and packet statistics which will be
discussed and finally visualization of network log files.
2.2 Visualizing Network Links and Layout
The work done in [11, 15] are representative of some earlier work done in using glyphs
to represent nodes and lines to represent links. Overcrowding of the nodes and links is a
problem with layouts. Authors of [15] used arcs lines and nodes on globe in a 3D view to
help reduce clutter. Arc height was related to statistics enabling crucial links to be shown
on the top so they were not hidden by other links. The authors of [11] allowed the data to be
filtered, which reduced the amount of data on the layout. User interaction allowed variation
of the symbol size, filtering of data presented, and using geographical maps. Recent work
on Internet mapping has been done by CAIDA [4].
There is some recent work that uses network layout methods for security. The tool
presented in [21] is used with the Hummer IDS and log files, uses glyphs and nodes where
line type and circle attributes show information about the link and system respectively. A
large circle, usually in the center, represents a server, while smaller nodes at a distance
represent systems connecting to the server. Nodes outside are placed either randomly or
according to force equations to avoid overlap. Colored links highlight unusual activity.
A replay of events is possible with the VCR like GUI. Lines and nodes fade when the
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connection ends. Haptics were used in [36] to visualize layout, and placed nodes according
to equations from gravitational theory, electromagnetics, and fluid dynamics. Link color
represented a severe attack.
Other work that represents IP addresses in a logical rather than topical fashion do not
have the same occlusion issues. Some use parallel plots in which a vertical axis represents
the entire IP addresses space from 0.0.0.0 to 255.255.255.255 where lines between them
show connections. VisFlowConnect is di!erent, in that it uses parallel plots to show the
connections between the inside network to the outside network [46]. Lines that show links
fade over time while line width shows tra"c volume. Filtering can be done for protocol,
port, IP address and tra"c threshold. Possible signs of attack were seen by dissymmetry
in the plot by connections where for e.g. an inside host connects to many outside subnets.
Also unusually large amounts of tra"c going back and forth are a possible indicator of
malicious activity. Rumint [13] also uses parallel plots to show connections. It also gives
users the option of mapping axes to other parameters, like port number. IP matrix [29],
uses 2 matrix of 256 by 256 to represent IP space so each one can represent two octets
of an P address. Local and internet level IP addresses are seen at the same time. The
advantage is that there is more focus on local addresses as compared to the parallel plots
where because the entire IP space is plotted, the scale of one class B will be very small.
The disadvantage is it is limited to one class B and connections can not be shown. TNV
[23] shows connections and also uses a time line and one can also view port connections.
IP addresses are mapped on vertical axes and time on the horizontal, so time patterns can
be seen but there is a limited amount of IP addresses that can be represented.
Some recent work, like [37], have di!erent visuals, the alert plot which is a combination
of 2D and 3D views. Two 256 by 256 matrix used to represent IP addresses as in [29] where
each square represent 2 octets of an IP address. Lines from these are drawn to another set of
matrixes to show connection to corresponding alarm glyphs. This has occlusion problems
since all adresses are represented in this area and it is easy for lines to overlap. It does not
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make e"cient use of screen space but zooming and panning are implemented. Figuring out
connections between IP addressees is harder to correlate with this scheme. Also, there is
no representation of time to visualize time patterns, all information seen in the screen is for
a specified time window. Filtering by priority helps with some of the occlusion issues and
detail on demand is available by clicking on an alarm circle to get more textual details.
These tools and techniques are useful in seeing a visual map of a network but issues
like occlusion, ine"cient use of screen space and scalability are problems. The IDS alarm
visualization tool we have developed improved on these techniques by focusing better on
local IP addresses using multiple axes rather an a 232 mapping, which scales better, is less
occluded, makes better use of screen-space and uses a timeline for viewing time patterns.
More is explained in the design section for IDS RainStorm (chapter 4) and in [9]
2.3 Network Statistics Visualization
Most systems use network flow data as the source of their visualizations. Therminator is
used with Lancope’s IDS, StealthWatch [7]. Therminator is a non-signature based real-time
visual tool. StealthWatch is also non-signature based, does monitoring in real time and can
be used for forensic analysis. Therminator is based on thermodynamic theories of energy,
entropy and temperature [22] and keeps track of network state over time [18]. Network
state is defined by the current setup of buckets and balls. Buckets are conversations that
are defined by information from packets, such as if hosts or networks are transmitting
data, the IP protocol and whether it is coming from a client or server. Balls represent
the data that is transferred among buckets. Each time a packet arrives a new network
state transpires and thermodynamic values are calculated and graphed. Any change in the
symmetry of the graph means there is some anomalous behavior. The IDS also provides
a detailed text event log. Flowscan [38] and NVisionIP [31] use Netflow data in its graph
visualizations. Netflow was developed by Cisco for their routers and now is open source
that other routers can use. It only collects flow information and not payload so the capture
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is smaller than raw packet capture. The extra information that a regular packet header
does not have are flow size, flow packet count, start and end of flow, and router IP (that
collected the flow information). Some disadvantages are that the flows are reported after
the termination of the flow so shorter flows will be reported first, according to the end time
and independent of the starting time. Also it is possible this information can be spoofed
and intercepted. Flowscan has an area plot of flows by amount of flows, the IP protocol
(TCPin/out, MCAST in/out, UDP in/out, ICMP in/out, Total in/out), and direction (in or out
of the network). Dissymmetry of in vs. out can indicate a problem such as in a DoS or port
scan. NVisionIP parses flow information from Netflow. From the flow statistics gathered,
NVisionIP implements three views which help to give an overall view of the network. In
the galaxy view, an entire class B IP space is shown via a 256x256 grid matrix, where each
point reps a unique class B IP address. Each point’s color represents how many times that
IP address was a source or destination of a flow. Further detail is seen in the small multiple
view which shows a subset of the IP addresses and histograms of flow port count for each
IP. Choosing one IP address to focus on gives the machine view where for that address a
user sees the flow port count for well-known and dynamic ports. Some more recent work,
as in [37], uses a 3D axis to show time, port numbers and number of bytes or packets. The
port axis is not fixed; it is dynamically allocated according to activity. To avoid possible
occlusion of port labels on the axis, the ports represented are limited to those that have a
certain amount of activity. If a port scan occurs, such as large scale scan, e.g. web server, it
would be seen rather than a basic host scan, because the amount of activity is greater for a
bigger scan and those so those ports will be seen. Scaling is not used, and high values can
skew results but it has an extra color bar that shows average amount over time in addition to
the actual value for that time instant. IDgraphs [39] uses flow records and represents over
time the following choices: number of unsuccessful attacks over time or unique IP and
destination port pairs. To avoid overlapping pixels, luminance is used to show data density.
PortVis [34] represents destination port as a 2 byte number mapped to an x and y axis
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matrix. Pixel location represents a port number and color represents number of sessions.
One can magnify on a particular area and select a port to see its histogram over time. One
would notice something wrong if you notice the colored pixels in the matrix. If a set of
contiguous ports have a lot of activity, and a port amongst them has suspicious activity, it
is harder to know that one needs to focus on that. Time patterns are not represented as all
data in one screen is shown for a window of time.
The advantages of plotting port statistics based on network header information is that a
flow does not have to finish for it to be represented. For especially long flows, the informa-
tion will not be presented in a timely manner. It uses scaling and grouping techniques to
allow all information to be seen at once while not becoming occluded and maintain good
use of screen space. More is in chapter 4 and [8].
2.4 Network Log Analysis
There have been several innovative approaches to log analysis. Representative of general
log visualizations developed for security are Tudumi [44] and Mielog [43]. Tudumi shows
server connection in a 3D visualization where lines represent connections and system nodes
are placed on rings. Information from several logs are combined to form this layout. Use of
3D allows more network groups to be portrayed, but occlusion is a problem if the number
of networks and nodes start to grow. Mielog shows log information in real time. Each line
in the graph represents one line in the log file. This method allows an overall view of the
log file along with straight-forward pattern observation.
Several tools have been developed to visualize and process Snort IDS [40] alarm log
files. One is SnortView [28] where a matrix view is used to show IP address connections
over time. Color is used to highlight user selected communication paths, and color is
also used to encode the alarm severity (high, medium and low priority). Glyphs are used
to encode network protocol type. Detailed information for the currently selected alarm is
given at the bottom of the display. This tool is successful in combiningmultiple parameters,
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visually representing them to assist analysts in finding anomalous behavior. However, the
amount of information shown is limited to a subset of IP address ranges, time (4 hours),
and number of attacks.
SnortSnarf [24] and ACID [16] display the Snort logs in a tabular format with limited
visualization, thus there is little to distinguish between these and traditional log files. The
only data processing performed are statistical analyses, but they are performed on a static
log file where real time data viewing is not possible. RazorBack [10] provides a GUI
interface for viewing alarms where alarm priority is represented by colored circles, and
web browser reloading provides updated data. Again, this is not a significant improvement
over alarm log files. What di!erentiates IDS Rainstorm from other tools is that it represents
2.5 class B IP address spaces (65,532 hosts ! 2.5 = 163,830 total) on one display. Mapping
alarms to pixels encodes a large amount of alarm data into one screen for a full 24-hour
period. Continuation of their work is in [29], which focuses more on IP addresses patterns
by using 2 matrixes of 256 by 256.
Our tool is able to show more information related to IDS alarms, represent more IP ad-
dresses with better scale and focus, show time patterns and implements zooming, panning




This chapter describes how network data needs to be processed before it is inputted to a
visualization system, covering both the data scaling process and the specific data param-
eters the systems use. Because of the high amount of tra"c and related data generated,
processing is necessary to produce a meaningful representation.
3.1 Scaling Data
Data needs to be scaled both before and after it is used as an input for a visualization be-
cause of the tremendous volume of data and the extensive range of parameters. Scaling
helps to avoid occlusion on the actual graph: without scaling, information might overlap
because display space is limited. Without scaling, it is also di"cult to represent parameters
that have long ranges in methods that involve sampling, scaling axes, and semantic repre-
sentation. This section describes the issues encountered in general and how they apply to
the two tools under discussion.
3.1.1 Overall Graph Occlusion
Ideally, we want to fit all the information needed on the graph without overlap or disorder.
Traditional information visualization methods suggest rearranging the data, allowing the
user to tilt, zoom, scale, and pan it to achieve the most meaningful display.
High value quantities in histograms used for visualizing port statistics would either
block or skew the relative scale, making it di"cult to interpret results. One method of
scaling data quantities involves using logarithms, but these tools use a cube root function
because it scales better with the range of values, including zero. The cube root function
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Figure 1: Scaling packet count using cube root for botnet tra"c capture1
also allows mapping values between zero and one (see Figure 1)1.
Figure 2: A system compromise by a botnet followed by the victim joining the botnet and
transmitting tra"c. Packet count every 15 minutes.1
One of the weaknesses of using the stacked histogram is that it may be di"cult to
evaluate data variations at the bottom of each column. The blue and green variables in
Figure 3 demonstrate this problem: it is hard to discern the green and red variables. One
solution is to use a popup window that displays measurement values and other details when
the user moves the mouse over a portion of the graph.
For viewing alerts, IDS Rainstorm uses mouse-over popup displays using gloss boxes
1Graphic reprint permission granted by the InformationAssurance TechnologyAnalysis Center’s (IATAC)
IAnewsletter, Volume 9 Number 1, Summer 2006
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Figure 3: Concept diagram of plotting technique. Port ranges are categorized and plotted
on the graph
to give detailed information for each alarm instance. The tool shows high-level informa-
tion like alarm severity through color, time, and pixel location,which help to show more
information in a limited area with details on demand using the glossing technique. Col-
lision issues with this tool occur when alarms are close in time or IP space (one example
in Figure 4. Two methods to deal with this are to show the alarm information with the
highest priority first, and giving the user the option to click on a cluster of alarms to view
information for other alarms clustered in this area.
Figure 4: Collision of alarm alerts occuring in close time and IP space proximity
3.1.2 IP Address and Port Number Scaling
Scaling is necessary to deal with 65,536 possible port numbers and over 4 billion possible
IP addresses (for the external network). Without scaling it would be impossible to display
data in a meaningful way or avoid the loss of important details.
Common ports are based on what services a network has. For visualizing port statistics,
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we divided the rest of the ports into ranges to provide less occlusion. A user can see the
details for a port range by selecting the range on the graph. In our examples, using the
Honeynet capture, we use the "Top Ten" [5] most probed ports as the known common
ports. For both Windows and Unix systems, the well-known and commonly assigned port
range is 0-1023 [2]. We want to focus more on these ports because we believe that a
majority of vulnerabilities and services occur in this range and most attacks start within
this range to gain access to the system. After separating the common ports, we place the
remaining "well-known" ports into bins of 100 (see Figure 3) so that they do not cause an
over-abundance of port segments that would be di"cult to read on the graph. We chose
100 as providing the best view of the relatively high activity in this range (in our plot, 0-
1099). The registered port range is 1024 through 49151 and can be used by any application;
these ports are also temporarily assigned for a connection attempt to a server. Tra"c can
occur here, but not as much as through the well-known ports. We divide this port range
into groups of 10,000 (in our plot, 1000-49,999). The private or dynamic ports are 49152
through 65535. Typically, no service should be assigned these ports. We include these ports
in one range, since they are frequently used by Trojans and other malicious applications,
but do not need to be displayed in as much detail as the lower port ranges [2]. A user can
zoom in on a selected range to see a more detailed data display. Plotting the port range
is a far more tractable problem when compared to visualizing the entire 32 bit external IP
address range.
For alert visualization, we need to focus on where alarms occur on a network being
monitored. Georgia Tech’s network consists of 2.5 Class B IP addresses which is fewer
than the total number of possible IP addresses, but still is a significant amount to scale for
a visual representation. To deal with displaying these IP addresses without occlusion, we




Scaling time allows us to see di!erent types of network activity at an appropriate level of
granularity. For forensic analysis or archives, the user can adjust the time sample to display
di!ering trends. For example, the time scale needed to display slow scans occurring over
long periods of time (perhaps years) would not be useful for displaying activity related
to viruses and worms quickly infiltrating a network. In real-time tra"c analysis, the time
window should be long enough to capture a representative sample of packets, but not so
long that fluctuations in port activity are hard to recognize.
Honeynet tra"c generates good illustrations for our visualization since all of the tra"c
is "abnormal" and because a specific attack has been collected in the captures we have used.
Of the techniques mentioned, time scaling needs more experimentation than the others to
be used e!ectively in the analysis of with regular network tra"c. We want just the right
granularity: if it is too small, we can mistake variances in normal tra"c to be anomalous,
and if it is too large, we will simply not see the variances that are anomalous. The other
scaling techniques are applicable to both situations. For example, the Sasser capture did
have other tra"c in the background (representative of "normal" background tra"c), and
through IP, port, and quantity scaling we are able to see both that background tra"c and
the penetration and subsequent activity of the Sasser worm. With more development and
testing, we would like to experiment with regular network tra"c.
Most alarm logs are archived into separate days to display an initial view of 24 hours
in a main screen, with the option of enabling a zoom view that allows zooming in on a
specific time range. In the case of events that occur close together in time and IP space,
the zoom view allows one to see the relevant data appropriately. For an active 24-hour
day, the main view will not be able to show the entire range of alarm information. Without
zooming, the user could miss important events or sequences of events. For days with
average tra"c, using 24 hours as the time range generally causes little occlusion. Testing
the alarm visualization updating in real time would require a shorter time span, but we need
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Figure 5: Packet header fields parsed for statistics gathering
to do more use testing to finalize our conclusions.
3.2 Data Parameters
This section describes the parameters used for port and alarm visualization and a discussion
of what guides the choice of parameters and their display.
3.2.1 Packet Capture and Header Fields
Tcpdump and pcap [3] (and the functionally equivalent winpcap for Windows) are general-
purpose packet capture libraries. "Pcap" collects any packet that it notices on the observed
network segment, and adds a header to it. The pcap header includes the time the packet
was received and the total size.
We carefully selected fields to maximize e!ectiveness and minimize processing over-
head (Figure 5). Timestamps are important for calculating the data statistics over time.
Port numbers allow us to track the activity on the ports and help to tie attacks to vulnerable
services. Packet size information and Internet Protocol (IP) addresses give detailed flow
information for the network.
3.2.2 Alarm Generation Using the StealthWatch IDS
The StealthWatch [47] anomaly-based IDS system is one of the security appliances de-
fending the Georgia Tech campus. It monitors flow activity and bandwidth usage to detect
anomalous behavior. StealthWatch does not need to know an attack’s signature in advance
to detect an attack. For our analysis, we were provided with StealthWatch IDS alarm logs
generated from inbound and outbound Internet tra"c on the perimeter of the Georgia Tech
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network. While we used StealthWatch logs, it is important to note that IDS Rainstorm can
be used for other IDS system alarm logs as well. An average of 7000 alarms is generated
in one day from StealthWatch. We have access to the following parameters.
3.2.2.1 Alarm Parameters
The StealthWatch IDS contains the following alarm parameters that we use in our visual-
ization tool:
• Alarm type: There are 33 alarm types, each identified by an integer value. System
administrators usually judge the severity of an alarm and classify the alarms them-
selves if their definition di!ers from that of the IDS company’s default definitions.
Alarm types can be categorized by severity, and in the tool color is used to represent
severity.
• Time: When each alarm is generated, the system records a unix timestamp with a
resolution of one second starting from the start of the unix epoch. This information
helps to determine the alarm’s temporal position among the rest of the alarms and
can help to display significant patterns or positions in a sequence of events.
• IP Addresses: The system records the internal LAN IP address that signaled the
alarm and, if an external IP is associated with the alarm, the system records the
external IP whether it is the victim or caused the alarm. Since the tra"c we are
monitoring is between the Internet and Georgia Tech, there will be no alarms caused
by internal IP to internal IP tra"c. The IP addresses are given as strings in dotted
decimal notation.
Some types of alarm records also include port number, threshold value, concern index, and
zone. We are currently working on a way to integrate this visually instead of just showing
text in a detailed view.
Commonly occurring StealthWatch alarm definitions include the following:
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• 61 Host Max Flows: Indicates that the host has had total active flows above some
threshold in the last five minutes. This could be DoS, DDoS activity against the host,
or the host sharing files on many connections. When activated, this alert also returns
the number of new flows in the last five minutes.
• 66 Watch Port Active: Indicates that a port on the port watch list has become ac-
tive. This alarm shows the external IP and the internal client IP. It also provides the
protocol and service used.
• 68 High Concern Index: Indicates that the suspect IP has exceeded a limit for the
accumulation of points based on flow anomalies called a Concern Index. Scanning
activity and other nonconforming behavior generally cause this alarm.
• 77 File Sharing: Indicates that the suspect IP is transferring a large number of files.
• 79 Touched: Indicates that a high Concern Index host has exchanged data with an
inside host. This may indicate a compromised host. The alarm details provide the
protocol and service that triggered this alarm.
• 82 Long Duration Flow: Indicates an IP communication between an inside and out-
side host that exceeds the configured seconds required to qualify a flow as long du-
ration. This alarm detects suspicious channels of communication such as spyware,
remote desktop technologies, VPNs, IRC botnets, and other covert means of com-
munication. It can also be triggered by legitimate use such as messenger programs,
streaming media, and web-based email.
• 93Watch Host Active: Indicates an IP communication between an inside and outside
host that exceeds the configured seconds required to qualify a flow as long duration.
This alarm detects suspicious channels of communication such as spyware, remote
desktop technologies, VPNs, IRC botnets, and other covert means of communication.
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It can also be triggered by legitimate use such as messenger programs, streaming




This chapter will describe how the two visualization systems were designed and imple-
mented. Additionally, the operation and features are described.
4.1 Visualizing Port Activity
4.1.1 Design Goals
Our goal is to get an overall view of what is happening on the network. In the case of
plotting port activity, we want to separate and arrange it to see important details without
occlusion. More specifically we wish to provide context first, followed by the user specified
detail in a drill down fashion. Seeing data over time will help to notice any patterns or
trends and is also helpful to see activity over a longer period of time. Our scheme shows
aggregate port quantity, instead of the more common flow count per IP. Some design goals
are as follows:
• We want this system to be useful for both forensic and real-time analysis.
• Making the tool lightweight and not CPU intensive is another goal. Only header in-
formation is stored, not the payload, dramatically reducing archival storage require-
ments.
• Reducing the time it takes to learn how to use and understand the tool is another
motivation. This helps to reduce the amount of time for understanding the visual
results and speeds reaction time for the person observing the visualization.
Using scaling techniques will reduce occlusion, and still show the overall view of the
network. In addition to IDS, the human eye can catch a pattern of a possible attack which
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will help to mitigate an attack or stop one. This tool does not need to run in conjunction
with an IDS, since it only needs to parse raw network data. It can complement the function
of the IDS by allowing human cognition and observation to assist in identifying attacks and
making subsequent decisions.
We used packet capture data from the Honeynet [32] at Georgia Tech for our visual-
ization examples. The Honeynet at GT is directly connected to the Internet and has no
production software therefore any incoming tra"c is suspicious. The machines have dif-
ferent operating systems hence they can be targeted by a wide variety of attacks.
4.1.2 Methodology
4.1.2.1 Histogram Plots
Histograms are easy to interpret and are good for visualizing a large data set because the
data fits easily onto the plot due to stacking, the intra-bar, relative sizing is insightful, and
comparisons with other bars on the chart are easily made based on their relative height
[27]. Using multidimensional data to plot a relationship between two parameters over time
can be visualized by using either a 3D chart or a 2D histogram. The disadvantage of a 3D
view is in comparing patterns, widths and heights that are at various distances from the
user, i.e., on the Z-axis, which can distort the perception [42]. Avoiding occlusion issues in
3D is di"cult, and often requires user navigation. In a 2D stacked chart, it could be more
di"cult to focus on activity for a single port. To test the e!ectiveness of these techniques,
we employed 2D visualizations against captures of real attacks.
4.1.2.2 Axis Parameters
The packet header fields can be categorized as ordinal (source and destination ports and IP
addresses) and interval (packet count and total bytes). The horizontal axis is time and the
vertical axis is used to display interval quantities. We chose to create stacked histograms
mapping the horizontal axis to time and the vertical axis to interval values of packet count
and total bytes. See Figure 3 for an example.
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4.2 Visualizing IDS Alerts
4.2.1 Design Goals
Our system, IDS Rainstorm, provides a main view that presents an overall representation
of all of Georgia Tech and a zoom view that provides more information on a user-selected
range of IP addresses. Our goal was to design an overall view that conveys enough infor-
mation so that an administrator can see network activity that needs immediate attention.
Once alerted to patterns of suspicious network activity, administrators can retrieve specific
details of particular alarms using the zoom view. Initially the tool was written using perl/tk
and then ported to Java/OpenGL (JOGL). Screenshots of the tool will be a combination of
both versions.
Figure 6: Design of the Basic Visualization and Representation. Each vertical axis rep-
resents IP addresses in sequential order. Each horizontal axis associated with the vertical
axes represent one 24 hour period.
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Figure 7: IDS RainStorm main view: The 8 vertical axes are shown that represent the 2.5
Class B IP addresses. The thicker horizontal lines between these axes show where each
Class B starts. The other horizontal lines show the start and end of each department. Those
addresses not in a department are either unallocated or reserved for special use by OIT and
other departments. This screenshot shows an entire day’s worth of real alarms generated.
4.2.2 Main View
Each of the views follows a general visualization technique developed to address this prob-
lem as shown in Figure 6. The visualization uses a set of rectangular regions that represent
(top-to-bottom) the set of contiguous IP addresses, where 20 addresses are allocated to a
row of pixels. Each column’s horizontal width represents 24 hours of network activity. In-
dividual colored dots in a row (IP addresses) represent total alarms for those 20 addresses at
a particular point in time (horizontal position). The alarm with the most severity out of the
20 addresses will appear. In addition, the user has the option of configuring StealthWatch to
correlate a series of low-priority events into a single higher priority alarm to reduce visual
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clutter [14].
Color represents alarm severity where red is high concern, yellow is medium concern,
and green is low concern. The IDS has default concern levels set, but a user can also modify
these. Currently, the default colors are what are shown in the tool.
The parameter with the largest range values is the 2.5 Class B IP addresses. Since a
way is needed to show an overview of all of them without cluttering the view, we applied
a method used in the Tarantula tool [19] and the SeeSoft tool [20] for representing large
source code files. Each represents a source line as a line of pixels, and then simply wraps
around to the next column to continue the sequence of source lines.
Figure 7 illustrates the concept of using multiple Y-axes to present a larger range of
points in addition to the idea of color-coding the severity of the alarm. Scaling time is not
as much of a concern since its range is not as large. We use 24 hours for the range shown
in detail in Figure 6. Both IP and time are aggregated onto their respective axis. Each
pixel on the x axis represents 20 minutes, and each IP on the multiple y-axis represent
approximately 20 IP addresses.
Figure 8: User selecting area to zoom in. (Here we have artificially highlighted a region
in green and magnified it to assist the reader.) The IP address shown is the one at the top
position in the red box region (the last two octets are intentionally blurred for privacy). The
result of the zoom is shown in Figure 9
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Figure 9: Zoom of a cluster of alarms seen in the overview. Also shown is the alarm
severity legend and internal and external IP axes layout. The selected subset of internal IP
addresses are represented on the left vertical axis, and external IP addresses on the right
vertical axis.
4.2.3 Zoom View
As a user moves the mouse across the overview, a red box highlights the current cursor
position as illustrated in Figure 8. This red box is an IP range selector. The IP address
representing that top position is printed at the top of the box. When a user clicks on the
overview, a secondary screen appears in a separate window with an enlarged view of the
portion enclosed by the red box. The IP range contained in the red box are now printed
in this view on the left. Labels are on the top horizontal axis to represent time within 24
hours. Alarms are seen as larger glyphs as seen in Figure 9. The zoom view also provides
other information such as extra alarm detail for each alarm and any external IP address
connections. Arrow are drawn to show connections between the external IP address and
local IP address shown in Figure 9. The arrow originates from the attacker IP and points
to the victim. One can zoom in and out of this zoom view by using the mouse wheel. A
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Figure 10: Concept diagram of the zoom view in IDS RainStorm.
concept diagram of the zoom layout is shown in Figure 10. The times labels in these zoom
views are shown horizontally along the top of the graph. Zooming is helpful in reducing
overlap when more than one alarm occurs for an IP address at the same time, and for
addresses that are close together in position.
4.2.4 Other techniques
4.2.4.1 Glossing
Glossing happens when a user moves the mouse cursor over an icon or particular text,
and expanded information is presented. The gloss disappears when the cursor is moved
away. In the zoom view, when a user mouses over a particular alarm glyph, a pop-up
gloss is shown that gives the alarm type, time, source and destination IP addresses. Also
mousing over an external IP creates a gloss, highlights that address and highlights the line
connecting the external IP address to the alarm glyph mapped on the graph. This is useful
when multiple external IP addresses overlap in the same area on the left axis. Examples of
these methods are shown in Figure 11.
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Figure 11: Gloss of alarm with corresponding line/arrow and external IP highlighted.
4.2.4.2 Indexing
When cluster of alarms are in the zoom view due to alarms occuring in close proximity, one
can index through those alarms using right and left button mouse clicks. Figure 13 shows
two zoomed screenshots indexing through 2 alarms that overlapped each other.
4.2.4.3 Filtering
IDS Rainstorm also includes simple filtering capabilities. In both the overview and zoom
views, the user may filter on alarm severity, choosing to show only the high critical alarms
(red), medium concern alarms (yellow), or the low concern alarms (green). This capability
can help the user to focus on particular alarms for further analysis and to sort through
multiple alarms that appear at the same time for a given set of IP addresses.
4.2.4.4 Panning
Panning results show in the zoom window and can be performed by moving up and down
the IP column using the up and down arrows or clicking and dragging in the main view.
The red box in the main view will move corresponding to what is seen in the zoom view.
This is illustrated in Figure 14. As the user zooms in more, panning left and right can be
done by using the right and left arrow keys. An example is shown in Figure 12.
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Figure 12: Screenshots of zooming and panning use to focus on a particular portion of a
cluster of alarms.
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Figure 13: Indexing through alarms with mouse button clicks.
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Figure 14: Two screenshots showing panning movement in the zoom view with the




The following classes of attacks are the most common types that occur. To help demonstrate
the e!ectiveness of the port visualization, packet captures of these attacks are visualized.
Screenshots of days in which significant security events occured on campus are shown and
explained to illustrate how one can use the IDS visualization to make discoveries.
5.1 Port Statistics Visualization
Figure 15: Network scan from honeynet, packet count every 2 minutes. Pattern or ports
probed over time is seen for this scan.1
5.1.1 Network Scanning and Mapping
Scanning a network is commonly a precursor to an attack. A blueprint of the network can
be made, finding active ports and IP addresses on the victim host. This is performed by
sending probe packets to groups of desired IP addresses. If a response is received, then
we know the respective ports and hosts are active. While less aggressive (or more subtle)
naive scans are relatively easy to detect, scans on common ports are di"cult to detect in
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the midst of legitimate network tra"c [41]. Typically, the packets are small, and few in
number. Such scans are di"cult to detect, particularly very slow scans. If non-existent
hosts and unused ports are probed it is easier to detect because we expect little or no tra"c
to those destinations. Visually we will see values plotted for port ranges that have not
shown up before as in Figure 15.
5.1.2 Viruses, Worms and Trojans
There are two primary motivations for those who create worms. One is for Distributed De-
nial of Service (DDoS) and the other for installing Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP)
servers that receive connections on high ports and relay mail (outbound connection) to port
25 of the destination server, normally used for Spam. Since traditional methods of propa-
gating Spam are being denied, worms are being used [35]. This allows a malicious sender
to generate Spam from all attackers’ compromised systems [30]. Infecting a system usu-
ally occurs by exploiting a vulnerability on a system. Once a system is infected, then it
will scan for other machines and infect those in a similar way. A burst of activity will be
seen on the vulnerable port. If penetration is successful we typically see odd behavior on a
backdoor port which is used to scan for other hosts to infect, see Figure 16.
Figure 16: Success of the Sasser worm and start of the worm tra"c - count for every 30
minutes1
5.1.3 Backdoors and Rootkits
A backdoor is installed after the successful takeover of a system to help maintain control.
It opens a port on the system to send and receive tra"c, thereby maintaining a hidden entry
33
Figure 17: Sasser graph with sorted out ports: 445, 135, 139, 1026, 53 and 80
Figure 18: Sasser graph of the p400 range filtered for focus. In this case tra"c is seen to
be from port 445
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point. Unusual activity on a normally active port or non-active port is readily apparent.
Packet count and total size increase in a visualization if a significant amount of data is
going in and out of the backdoor. Similar to backdoors, rootkits go one step further and
replace existing application binaries instead of running as a new application like a backdoor
does, e.g. a modified telnet program can be a rootkit. Another covert method to access a
port is with IRC bots, which have been used for DDoS attacks. The binary for the bot is
small and can easily be installed on someone’s systemwithout their knowledge. Commands
can then be passed to the bot. Typically the bot is told to attack a given IP address. The
servers and channels the bots are placed on can be di"cult to find when the channel is set
to hidden. Detecting unknown bot activity requires a check on the default IRC port 6667
or other chose ports [1]. In this case, there would be a rise of packets on the IRC port or
other chosen ports used to transmit the bot tra"c (see Figure 2).
5.1.4 Summary
This prototype helps to show the pattern and quantity of tra"c on ports and systems where
unknown attacks can be identified without a signature. Because of the general character-
istics of how common attacks behave, this is a useful scheme. Observing port behavior is
both a good indicator for a precursor of an attack or an actual attack. Our approach did not
help to detect malicious behavior during the actual compromise on the local system (ie.,
when someone gained root access). Also, the prototype does not show network topology,
layout and link information. Flow information is also not considered, just individual packet
header data. Subsequently we get the port information instantaneously, and do not wait for
a flow to finish, especially that of long flows.
The following graphs are of Sasser worm [32] and botnet [6] activity from the Hon-
eynet. These results are used to illustrate the e"cacy of the system, such as scaling, and
overview/detail.
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Figure 19: Same packet count of Sasser using a smaller time scale of 5 minutes.1
The first example considers the Sasser worm. Figure 16 shows normal probes and chat-
ter that usually occur. The spikes indicate an increase of packet count for two port ranges.
In the region labeled port 445, the port 400 range in red show the start of Sasser activity
which had at that point successfully broke into the system. The tcpdump log showed that
all of this was from port 445. In the region labeled port 2552, which represents ports 1,100-
10,000, was a response port to port 445. Again, checking the log indicated that this was
port 2552. This example shows that a user can be guided to notice activity in these port
ranges, in the midst of usual tra"c. Without having to look at the log, the user can focus on
the port 400 range by filtering the graph to show only the port counts for 400 to 500. This
is shown in figure 18, where we can see that this is port 445.
Ports that are commonly used on a network can be sorted out from the port ranges
and plotted on its own. Doing this helps to both focus on the usual active ports for any
abnormality and reduce the count from the port ranges. When the count is reduced, we
can then focus on the rest of the ports which we do not usually expect tra"c without being
occluded by the high count of the active ports. We can see the same tra"c capture of Sasser
in figure 17 where ports from the top ten probed ports list are sorted out from the rest. At
that time ports 445, 135, 139, 1026, 53 and 80 were getting probed on the Honeynet, which
is why we choose to single these out for this illustration. The circled region shows where
port 445 is plotted now. Compared to Figure 16, we can focus on port counts in the ranges
minus the value of port 445 count obscuring the counts.
36
Figure 20: Scaling packet count using cube root for botnet tra"c capture.1
In circled region of figure 19, we can see the start of p400 (port 445), to appear jagged,
compared to the original graph count of every 30 minutes. A smaller time sample helps to
notice behavior sooner, which is important for a regular network that needs to react quickly,
but at the cost of a smaller picture. One example is the network scan that occurred in 30
minutes (figure 15) where we needed a smaller time scale to quickly notice this activity.
We can see the ports with smaller counts more clearly and its pattern over time using a
cube root. In the botnet graph, because of the high count of bot packets skewing the scale
(around 17,000), all of the other values are barely visible. In figure 20, we can see the
other port activity now. Those were the vulnerabilities the bots were trying to exploit on
the Honeynet system, until they were successful and installed the bot.
This has been kept as a prototype because viewing port information is not enough to
detect all types of attacks. This can be used as part of a visual tool and the methods used
to scale and view the data could be used scaling larger amounts of data with large scales of
parameters.
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5.2 IDS Alert Visualization
5.2.1 High Alarm Count
The first example deals with a cluster of alarms in one area of the graph. One case is
illustrated in Figure 8, which shows a cluster of alarms over a full day selected and enclosed
by the red box. This stands out compared to the rest of the graph, and the concentration is
high for this range of IP addresses. When the user zooms in on this region, the resulting
view appears as shown in Figure 9. The alarms can be seen more clearly but there is
still some occlusion which has occurred because many alarms have been triggered for IP
addresses located closer together in sequence. In the tool, two methods can be used to help
with this problem. One is to zoom again, as is shown in Figure 21. Note that this has
the same layout as in the original zoom view, but now we see alarms for 12 hours rather
than the entire 24 hour period. This spreads the alarm glyph representations over a wider
axis which reduces glyph occlusion. A second method for fighting occlusion is to filter by
alarm level (color). In this example, the range of IP addresses are actually Akamai (content
delivery) servers for GT’s website content. Active servers generally trigger many alarms,
unless the IDS is carefully tuned. Re-calibrating for hosts which trigger a high alarm count
could hide alarm counts that occur on less active hosts; therefore the thresholds have not
been modified. Though these alarms are generated by the IDS, human analysis and the
visualization help to rule out these alarms as a serious problem because they have occurred
on the logical IP space reserved for Akamai.
5.2.2 Exteral IP Connection Patterns
Another useful activity is to pan through the graph by clicking the mouse and dragging the
IP range selector, or red box, through the overview. The resulting motion is shown in the
zoom view. An example overview is shown in Figure 22 where the user clicks and drags
on an area, and the corresponding zoom views are shown in Figure 23 to illustrate this
technique. Time is constant while the internal IP addresses on the left vertical axis change
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Figure 21: A zoom view on time. This zoom is a double zoom view of Figure 9. Internal
IP addresses are on the left and external IP addresses are on the right.
sequentially. The external IP addresses on the right axis maintain the same 232 bit mapping
but as the user scrolls in the main view, the external IP addresses appear (and disappear)
based on alarm activity associated with the changing/moving internal IP addresses. This
activity allows traversal through the range of IP addresses to find detailed patterns. The
external IP addresses remain constant through the panning, and this helps to find if there is
some address or range of addresses trying to attack the network.
This technique in the tool is useful for when anomalous behavior could be targeting
internal IPs that are spread across the logical space, like botnet and worm activity. The day
of alarms shown in Figure 22 had a cluster of activity between 12:00 - 18:00 that happened
consistently in certain portions of the IP address space. Most of these were Long Duration
Flow alarms where a flow lasts longer than a set specified time amount. If the external
IP is from an ISP (an individual user) then the long duration activity is suspicious. AOL,
Hotmail, and Podcasting are examples of applications that can set o! long duration alarms
since the connection usually stays open until the user closes it. A user needs to be familiar
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Figure 22: June 22nd overview. Clicking and dragging on the overview appears in the
zoom view (shown in Figure 23) and animates the traversal down the IP space. The external
IP axis is held constant.
with the local IP, such as what they can run, and if they are authorized to be a server or
not. This coupled with the techniques demonstrated in this example will make determining
patterns in which external IPs are connecting to the local network and whether an alarm is
high concern, easier.
5.2.3 Dorm Activity
Figure 24 is an overview for alarms generated on April 26, 2005. Some patterns immedi-
ately noticed are that most alarms seem to occur in the last half of the day and for several of
the IP ranges, similar patterns across them can be seen. One such range occurs on the left
most column (region 1, Figure 24). These IP addresses are for the campus dorm residents.
Upon taking a closer look, most of these alarms appear to be long duration flows. Most of
the external IP addresses associated with these come from AOL instant messenger servers.
Students are most likely starting their instant messenger programs later in the day after
classes are over. If Host Max Flows alarms are seen here, then based upon our analyst’s
experience, that host is running a warez server or has a backdoor port. It is against campus
policy to run a file sharing server, whether it is voluntary or not, hence that host’s access to
the Internet will be blocked and the student will be notified.
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Figure 23: Panning results of Figure 22 shown as two transitions.
5.2.4 Worms, Viruses, Trojans
In this same figure, a cluster of red alarms at the bottom left can be seen in the midst of
usual mid priority alarms in the dorm IP space (region 2 in Figure 24). Here one IP address
was a source for Watch Port Active alarms from many external IPs as shown in Figure 25.
A close-up of this activity showing the 3:00-6:00 pm time range can also be seen in Figure
25. A known exploitable port that had recently hit GT was added to the watch list and
compromised on the host. The alarm pattern shows successful worm penetration as the
host had consistent communication to various IP addresses.
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Figure 24: Overview of April 27th alarms. (Two regions are artificially identified in green
and magnified for easier viewing.) Here region 1 shows activity in a subset of campus
dorm IP addresses, a cluster of activity for a machine in the dorm is outlined in region 2
and region 3 shows a cluster of activity in occurring over a small range of IP addresses for
the entire day.
5.2.5 Botnet
Also, on the same day, is another cluster of red alarms (region 3, Figure 24). These alarms
are Watch Host Active. Some of these external hosts have made connections to other hosts
on the local network previously and had bots installed on them. These bots were more
active around midnight and in the figure we can see similar activity around midnight. The
next day, for the same IPs, you can see almost the same time pattern of activity. The zooms
for each consecutive day can be seen in Figure 26. We can conclude these IP addresses have
become infected with a bot, that has a specific time pattern of activity. These examples
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Figure 25: April 26th worm activity for a particular host located in the campus dorms.
The left side is the zoom view of region 2 highlighted in Figure 24. The right side is a
zoom of the left view that shows the activity from 3:00-6:00pm.
Figure 26: Bot activity shown for the same IP address space on April 26 (left) and April
27 (right). The activity time pattern for the two days is almost identical.
show how analysis is improved for casual occurring alarms (general dorm activity) and
ones that were triggered due to anomalous behavior (botnet and worm case).
5.2.6 Summary
This tool, or visualization, is not designed to operate in isolation, but instead something
to be used with other IDS tools. An IDS that checks for signatures can help with slow,
stealthy activity, and an IDS that checks for anomalies can detect activity that deviates
from a defined baseline. These methods are not enough, however, because network behav-
ior is dynamic. The visualization enhances the view and adds another layer of analysis that
allows us to notice activity that machines cannot. Other monitoring tools can optionally be
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re-coded or re-calibrated according to insights gained from human observation. Nonethe-
less, the tool is only good as the data it receives; therefore, some problems can be di"cult
to find especially when false alarms are part of the data.
These examples show how analysis is improved for reoccurring alarms-due to general
dorm activity-and for alarms that were triggered due to anomalous behavior (botnet and
worm case). The visualization enhances the analysts’ view of the logs and lets them more
easily notice activity that machines cannot. Other monitoring tools can optionally be re-
coded or recalibrated according to insights gained from human observation. Nonetheless,
the tool is only as good as the data it receives; therefore, some problems can be di"cult to
find especially when false alarms are part of the data. The underlying IDS system gener-
ates this alarm data and, unfortunately, even today’s best systems are prone to some degree
of false alarms and are unable to detect all classes of anomalous activity. IDS RainStorm
implements general techniques for displaying whatever alarms are generated by any IDS.
These visual images can give a system administrator a frame of reference of what a
usual day looks like. If any day deviates from this image, then the system administrator
may need to investigate further to find out if change is anomalous or not. Comparing a new
view to a normal day’s image is a much faster process than trying to do the same with text
logs (the image of a day can be saved for later reference). This is significant for the amount
of tra"c that a large campus generates. This type of analysis also shows the advantage a hu-
man has over machine learning algorithms used to find anomalous activity. Situations and
changes in the network can make changes to alarm patterns. Machine learning algorithms




This chapter describes the user study process that was used to design the tool and make
subsequent additions. First, the network analysts’ duties and the Georgia Tech network are
described. Then how we used this information to design the tool is explained. Finally, the
user evaluations of the tool and the results are given.
6.1 Background
We interviewed O"ce of Information Technology (OIT) system administrators at Georgia
Tech, to learn about the stages in the alarm analysis process. Primarily, how alarms are
monitored, the criteria that governs the next action, and the method in which alarms are
analyzed. The requirements collected during these interviews guided the design of our
visualization system.
OIT at Georgia Tech maintains the campus-wide network of computing resources. The
organization also provides and maintains the Internet links coming in and out of campus,
and is in charge of protecting the campus data. The security branch of OIT monitors the
network and provides technical and educational support to the campus population.
In addition to OIT, each academic department operates its own internal network inde-
pendently and keeps track of all operational hardware and software as well as user privi-
leges and access management. The individual department system administrators, or Com-
puter Support Representatives (CSRs), install patches, run virus protection programs, and
check regularly for strong password compliance. They are the most familiar with their
own departmental network. When security incidents become known to OIT, typically via
their campus wide network of intrusion detection systems and firewalls, they will inform
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the respective department and collaborate on problem resolution. If the CSR does not stop
the problem or requires assistance, an OIT Information Security Specialist will investigate
further. This is often performed at the center Network Operations Center by sni"ng the
tra"c going to the particular host and examining the capture log. One exception is the stu-
dent housing network (ResNet) where individual hosts are automatically quarantined from
Internet use until the student fixes the problem or patches the vulnerability.
The Georgia Institute of Technology’s total campus population is approximately 15,000
undergraduate and graduate students and approximately 5,000 sta! and faculty. There are
69 individual departments spread over the campus with between 30,000-35,000 networked
computers operational at any given time. The total amount of IP addresses allocated to
Georgia Tech is equivalent to 2.5 Class B addresses. The connection from the campus to
the Internet includes two OC-12’s and one OC-48 with an average throughput of 600Mbps.
On average, over four terabytes of data is processed each day. With the large size of the
campus network, OIT’s main concern is determining the location of high-priority alarms
and e!ectively allocating limited human resources to resolve the problem.
In order to determine whether the alarms are significant or not, OIT analysts typically
rely upon alarm count, alert severity and time of day. Browsing through text alarm log files
is usually the method used. IDS tools come with visual components, but calibrating tools
to filter and visualize alarm data is tedious. Therefore, administrators ultimately resort to
text logs instead. An average of 50,000 alarms are generated from IDS sensors installed
across the campus network each day. Currently, it takes a significant amount of the analysts
time to sift through the alarms and determine which concerns are immediate, which need
further analysis and which can be ignored, at least temporarily. The process of determining
that an alarm was triggered due to a serious problem requires knowing what services the
particular host provides, i.e., is this a department server, or a single user machine. Then
deciding if immediate action needs to be taken depends what the location and function of
the host is, for example, a major department server will compel immediate action while a
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student’s system in the dorm will not.
6.2 Methodology
Based on the information we received from the network analysts and going over the alarm
parameters, the tool was designed. Location of alarm is one of the most important variables
to help determine anomalous activity and knowing the source. To cover a network of this
size, e"cient use of screen space was important which is why multiple vertical axes are
used. Time sequence is also given space on the horizontal axis while other information is
visually encoded. Details were explained in section 4.2. Users who analyze IDS alarms for
mid-size to large networks were surveyed after the first version of the tool was developed.
This helped to design the extra functions developed since then. We also have received
feedback based on the current version of the tool. As of this writing, more features have
been added based on analyzing the feedback from the first version of the tool.
6.3 Results
A survey and questionnaire was used to get written feedback on the tool. Some of the
questions were as follows:
• Did you still want to refer back to the text log for information while using this tool?
If so, for what?
• What information was missing from the overall view that could have pointed you out
to important events?
• What was the least useful or distracting feature and why?
• What was the best feature and how was it useful? Were there any insights or discov-
eries you made that you think were easier in this tool versus going through traditional
methods (text logs, IDS graphical interface)?
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They were asked to rate the following:
• Information represented was intuitive and made sense.
• Operation and performance of zooming and panning was good.
• It was useful to see the main screen while panning in the zoom view.
• Traversing overlapped lines and clustered alarm marks in the zoom view by clicking
mouse buttons was useful and intuitive.
• Using the tool was faster in determining if alarm(s) are false or required further in-
vestigation compared to using the text logs.
• There was enough information in the overview to get a general idea of activity, iden-
tify alerts of interest and drill down for more detail.
• It was simple to use and to learn how to use this tool.
• This system has all the functions and capabilities I expect it to have.
All concurred that the current tool saves hours of time and that it was simple and intu-
itive to use. They found it helpful to see alarm event sequences and patterns using the time
axis. Seeing what hosts were making connections and triggering alarms with lines showing
those connections was also mentioned as an advantage. Additionally, all users thought the
performance of the tool functions, such as zooming, panning, mouse-overs and filtering
operated well and were easy to use. Some rarely feel the need to return to the alarm text
log while some felt when they pinpoint an activity, they would look to the IDS console to
get extra information.
The process of implementation has been an iterative one. In each stage, improvements
can be made and going back to users for re-evaluation helps to reinforce the design as
well. Features can be universally helpful, but some are unique to the type of network and
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responsibilities of the analyst so one tool will not be ideal for everyone. Currently this tool




In this thesis new techniques were developed to aid in network security using information
visualization. Research contributions have been made in the following:
• Network data scaling and processing
• Port activity visualization
• Useful visualization showing a larger amount of information than textual methods
• Scaling port numbers and IP address for maximum use of screen space without oc-
clusion
• Performing and using user study results to design an IDS alarm visualization tool
7.1 Research Contributions
Chapter 1 explained motivations for using information visualization with network data for
security purposes and background on the two data types we used. Chapter 2 describes
some of the related state of the art in this growing area. Methods for scaling data and data
parameters, data processing and a description of data parameters is described in chapter
3. Chapter 4 dsecribes the goals we have for the systems, how they were designed and
explains how they function. We have worked with forensic data and IDS alarm logs showed
these results. Chapter 5 describes threat models and case scenarios for the systems. Brief
explanations of the general types of attacks that networks encounter were also given to
explain how visualizing port activity would be helpful. Casual and anomalous events that
occurred that were easier to find using IDS Rainstorm are shown as examples along with the
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possible steps a network administrator would take in using the tool to find these. Chapter
6 discusses the user study that was performed to develop the design of IDS Rainstorm and
the the feedback given after the tool was evaluated. Appendix A gives resources in network
security visualization for those that are interested in this area.
7.1.1 Port Activity
The advantages of plotting port statistics based on network header information is that a flow
does not have to finish for it to be represented. For especially long flows, the information
will not be presented in a timely manner. It uses scaling and grouping techniques to allow
all information to be seen at once while not becoming occluded and maintains good use of
screen space.
7.1.2 Alerts
A user study was first performed to create the design and then feedback on the tool to
evaluate the result. The feedback will also help for future work. This tool makes better
use of screen space by representing more IP addresses by using multiple vertical axes than
other tools and still show time patterns giving a visual map of the network. Zooming and
panning are implemented to provide details on demand in addition to the main view which
is useful for viewing even more information.
7.2 Future Work
Viewing more types of data are needed to get a full picture of network activity. More
data parameters will also be helpful, but they must be visually encoded in a way that will
not clutter up screen space and aid analysts in their tasks. When developing port activity
visualization it showed that network activity findings were easier but it only shows one per-
spective and a subset of attack types. We also learned that going further with development
would require user studies. Some of the techniques used, in addition to a user study, were
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then used to develop a visualization for IDS alarms. A summary of the feedback given and
other future work we realized during this process are given:
• Remap the two axes such that the entire internal IP address range is on the left and
a small set of suspicious external IPs are on the right. For example, if a worm is
targeting a network and the IPs a!ected are spread across the IP space of the network,
then it is di"cult to correlate the behavior. A subset of these external IPs that connect
to the local network can be plotted on the right parallel axis and the entire local IP
space condensed on the left axis. This will help to see what hosts are triggering
alarms due to activity of the external IP address.
• Combine alert outputs from the other IDS systems used in the tool to review each
system’s output and help with false alarms.
• Find a way to show alarms repeated from other tools to help rule out false alarms and
determine legitimate alarms.
• Integrate netflow information to correlate what hosts are making connections to the
network along with the alarm data.
• Showing the country of the external IP and reducing occlusion when external IPs that
are printed overlap.
The IDS alarms we used was from one sensor and not the total amount of alarms ac-
tually generated from all sensors. Enhanced filtering and improved querying capabilities
such as on specific alarm(s), IP addresses, port number(s), and protocol will be required to
compensate for the increased number of alarms. This will also be necessary if other IDS




This section describes some of the excellent books in this area, along with technical in-
formation and other network visualization tools that have been developed. There are also
good websites that give a lot of information, most of themmade by people who are working
diligently in this growing field. Hopefully this will be useful to those who are interested in
visualization for network security.
A.1 Books
Edward Tufte is at the top of the list. His books and writings have given a good base
of knowledge and inspiration. He also has seminars in di!erent cities. His website has
information on his works and his seminar schedule. It has a very active message board in
which Edward Tufte himself participates and answers questions. People from various fields
of work and study can benefit. http://www.edwardtufte.com/tufte/index
His list of books are:
• The Visual Display of Quantitative Information
• Envisioning Information
• Visual Explanations: Images and Quantities, Evidence and Narrative
There are two books used in the Information Visualization (CS 7450) class at Georgia
Tech that explain the fundamentals. The first is the required text for the class and the other
a suggested text.
• Information Visualization by Robert Spence
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• Information Visualization, Second Edition : Perception for Design by Colin Ware
A.2 Tools
For data capture of raw network packets tcpdump or an equivalent packet capture library
for your operating system is needed. http://www.tcpdump.org/
For IDS alarms, Snort is a good option as it is open source. http://www.snort.org/
Below are some tools developed for network security visualization:
Rumint by Gregory Conti visualize packet data using 7 di!erent views. It runs on the
Windows OS. http://www.rumint.org/
John Goodall’s tool TNV visualizes activity using a matrix view, where x axis is time
and y axis maps to IP addresses:
http://userpages.umbc.edu/~jgood/research/tnv/
NVisionIP show flow activity on a network, allowing a user to drill down for more
details on particular host(s):
http://security.ncsa.uiuc.edu/distribution/NVisionIPDownLoad.html
VizFlowConnect visualizes flow connections between hosts using parallel axes:
http://security.ncsa.uiuc.edu/distribution/VisFlowConnectDownLoad.html
A.3 Programming Resources
JOGL, the OpenGL extensions for Java was used for the IDS alarm visualization tool. Java
was chosen as we were familiar with this language and for its platform dependancy, and
OpenGL for its performance and features. Ultimately, any programming language is fine,
as long as one can implement and demonstrate ideas. There will be some start up time
involved in getting used to OpenGL, but because of the capabilities of OpenGL, it is worth
the e!ort. There are OpenGL extensions available for many other programming languages
like perl, C, and python.
JOGL resources:
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Homepage for the JOGL API project. Includes downloads to the JOGL libraries:
https://jogl.dev.java.net/
The Java Gaming website includes a forum on JOGL which includes helpful informa-
tion and resources: http://www.javagaming.org/forums/index.php
Others have used Flash Macromedia, Java2D, and Perl/Tk to name a few. If one is
creating a prototype for demonstration purposes, any language should work.
A.4 Website
The VizSEC (Visualization Security) Community Homepage has a mailing list and infor-




[1] “Netsys.com: The intelligent hacker’s choice.” DDoS article Available at:
http://www.netsys.com/library/papers/ddos-ircbot.txt; accessed 28-
March-2004. 5.1.3
[2] “Port numbers.” Internet Assigned Numbers Authority. Available at:
http://www.iana.org/assignments/port-numbers; accessed 28-May-2004.
3.1.2
[3] “Tcpdump/libpcap.” Available at: http://www.tcpdump.org/; accessed 28-
March-2004. 3.2.1
[4] “Visualization.” Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis. Available
at: http://www.caida.org/analysis/visualization; accessed 28-June-2003.
2.2
[5] “10 most probed ports.” Distributed Intrusion Detection System, June 2004. Available
at: http://www.dshield.org/topports.php; accessed 28-March-2004. 3.1.2
[6] “The honeynet project: Scan of the month,” 2004. Available at:
http://project.honeynet.org/scans/; accessed 28-March-2004. 5.1.4
[7] “Stealthwatch+therminator.” Lancope, 2004. Available at:
http://www.lancope.com/; accessed 03-March-2006. 2.3
[8] A!"#$$%&, K., L'', C., C()*+, G., and C(,'$%)", J. A., “Visualizing network data for
intrusion detection,” in IEEE Information Awareness Workshop at West Point, June
2005. 2.3
[9] A!"#$$%&, K., L'', C., C()*+, G., C(,'$%)", J., and S*%-.(, J., “Ids rainstorm: Visu-
alizing ids alarms,” in IEEE Symposium on Information Visualization’s Workshop on
Visualization for Computer Security (VizSEC), pp. 1–10, 2005. (document), 2.2
[10] A$$+%)/', I., “Razorback - snort network intrusion detection front-end.” Avail-
able at: http://www.intersectalliance.com/projects/RazorBack/; ac-
cessed 03-May-2005. 2.4
[11] B'/.'0, R., E+/., S., and W+$.-, A., “Visualizing network data,” IEEE Transactions
on Visualization and Computer Graphics, vol. 1, pp. 16–28, March 1995. 2.2
[12] C%0", S. K., M%/.+)$%1, J. D., and S&)'+"'02%), B., Readings in Information Visual-
ization: Using Vision to Think. Morgan Kaufmann, 1999. 1
56
[13] C()*+, G. and A!"#$$%&, K., “Passive visual fingerprinting of network attack tools,”
in VizSEC/DMSEC ’04: Proceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on Visualization and
data mining for computer security, (New York, NY, USA), pp. 45–54, ACM Press,
2004. 2.2
[14] C()*+, G., A!"#$$%&, K., G0+33%0", J., S*%-.(, J., C(,'$%)", J. A., A&%2%", M.,
O4'), H. L., and L'', C., “Countering security information overload through alert
and packet visualization,” IEEE Computer Graphics and Applications, 2006. 1.1.1,
1.1.1.2, 4.2.2
[15] C(5, K. and E+/., S., “Case study: 3d displays of internet tra"c,” in Proceedings
of Information Visualization (INFOVIS), IEEE Computer Society, pp. 129–131, Oct.
1995. 2.2
[16] D%)1$+4, R., “Analysis console for intrusion databases (acid).” Available at:
http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/rdanyliw/snortacid.html; accessed 03-
May-2005. 2.4
[17] D'!%0, H. and W'-,+, A., “Aggregation and correlation of intrusion detection alerts,”
in Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection (RAID), pp. 85–103, Springer-Verlag,
2001. 1
[18] D()%$", S. D. and M/M+$$'), R. V., Therminator2: Developing a Real Time Thermo-
dynamic Based Patternless Intrusion Detection System. PhD thesis, Naval Postgrad-
uate School, Monterey, California, 2001. 2.3
[19] E%6%), J., H%00($", M. J., J()'-, J. A., and S*%-.(, J., “Technical note: Visually
encoding program test information to find faults in software,” in Proceedings of IEEE
Information Visualization 2001, (San Diego, CA), pp. 33–36, October 2001. 4.2.2
[20] E+/., S. G., S*'77'), J. L., and E0+/ E. S#2)'0, J., “Seesoft-a tool for visualizing line
oriented software statistics,” IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, vol. 18,
no. 11, pp. 957–968, 1992. 4.2.2
[21] E0!%/&'0, R., W%$.'0, K., and F0+)/.', D., “Intrusion and misuse detection in
large-scale systems,” Computer Graphics and Applications, vol. 22, pp. 38–48, Jan-
uary/February 2002. 2.2
[22] F(0", D., “Application of thermodynamics to the reduction of data gen-
erated by a non-standard system,” tech. rep., Department of Physics
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA., Feb. 2004. Available at:
http://www.arxiv.org/abs/cond-mat/0402325; accessed 03-May-2005.
2.3
[23] G(("%$$, J. R., L#**'0-, W. G., R&'+)6%)-, P., and K(2$("+, A., “Preserving the big
picture: Visual network tra"c analysis with tnv,” in IEEE Symposium on Information
Visualization’s Workshop on Visualization for Computer Security (VizSEC), pp. 47–
54, 2005. 2.2
57
[24] H(%6$%)", J. A. and S*%)+7(0", S., “Viewing ids alerts: Lessons from snortsnarf,”
in Proceedings of 2001 DARPA Information Survivability Conference and Exposition
(DISCEX 2001), pp. 12–14, 2001. 2.4
[25] J#$+-/&, K., “Clustering intrusion detection alarms to support root cause analysis,” in
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, vol. 6, ACM Press, Novem-
ber 2003. 1
[26] J#)6/., P. and S&+2, S. S. Y., “Issues in high-speed internet security,” Computer,
vol. 37, pp. 36–42, July 2004. 1
[27] K'+2, D., H%(, M., and D%1%$, U., “Hierarchical pixel bar charts,” IEEE Transac-
tions on Visualization and Computer Graphics, vol. 8, pp. 255–269, July-Sept. 2002.
4.1.2.1
[28] K(+.', H. and O&)(, K., “Snortview: Visualization system of snort logs,” in
VizSEC/DMSEC’04 (ACM, ed.), (Washington DC, USA), October 29 2004. 2.4
[29] K(+.', H., O&)(, K., and K(+3#2+, K., “Visualizing cyber attacks using ip matrix,”
in IEEE Symposium on Information Visualization’s Workshop on Visualization for
Computer Security (VizSEC), pp. 91–98, 2005. 2.2, 2.4
[30] K0%4'*3, N., “Anti-spam solutions and security, part 2.” Security Focus. Available
at: http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1766; accessed 09-March-2004.
5.1.2
[31] L%..%0%8#, K., Y#0/+., W., and L'', A. J., “Nvisionip: netflow visualizations of
system state for security situational awareness,” in VizSEC/DMSEC ’04: Proceedings
of the 2004 ACM workshop on Visualization and data mining for computer security,
(New York, NY, USA), pp. 65–72, ACM Press, 2004. 2.3
[32] L'9+)', J., L%B'$$%, R., O4'), H., C()*+-, D., and C#$9'0, B., “The use of honeynets
to detect exploited systems across large enterprise networks,” in Proceedings of the
IEEE Workshop on Information Assurance, IEEE Systems, Man and Cybernetics So-
ciety, (West Point, NY), pp. 92–99, June 2003. 1.1.1.1, 4.1.1, 5.1.4
[33] L12%), P., “How much information 2003,” October 2003. Available at:
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/how-much-info-2003; accessed 28-
March-2004. 1
[34] M/P&'0-(), J., M%, K.-L., K01-*(-'., P., B%0*($'**+, T., and C&0+-*')-'), M.,
“Portvis: A tool for port-based detection of security events,” in VizSEC/DMSEC’04
(ACM, ed.), (Washington DC, USA), October 29 2004. 2.3
[35] M+2(-(, M., “Experts ponder spam, worm-writing connection.” Search Security, Nov.
2003. Available at: http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/; accessed 03-March-2004.
5.1.2
58
[36] N1%0.(, K., C%,'0-, T., S/(**, C., and L%"'8+-O-+%-, K., “Network intrusion visu-
alization with niva: an intrusion detection visual analyzer with haptic integration,”
in 10th Symposium on Haptic Interfaces for Virtual Environment and Teleoperator
Systems (HAPTICS ’02), pp. 277–284, March 2002. 2.2
[37] O$+)', A. and R'+)'0-, D., “Exploring three-dimensional visualization for intrusion
detection,” in IEEE Symposium on Information Visualization’s Workshop on Visual-
ization for Computer Security (VizSEC), pp. 113–120, 2005. 2.2, 2.3
[38] P$().%, D., “Flowscan: A network tra"c flow reporting and visualization tool,” in
Proceedings of the USENIX Fourteenth System Administration Conference LISA XIV,
2000. 2.3
[39] R'), P., G%(, Y., L+, Z., C&'), Y., and W%*-(), B., “Idgraphs: Intrusion detection
and analysis using histographs,” in IEEE Symposium on Information Visualization’s
Workshop on Visualization for Computer Security (VizSEC), pp. 39–46, 2005. 2.3
[40] R('-/&, M., “Snort.” Available at: http://www.snort.org/; accessed 03-May-
2005. 2.4
[41] S.(#"+-, E., Counter Hack: A Step-by-Step Guide to Computer Attacks and E"ective
Defenses. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2001. 5.1.1
[42] S,')/', R., Information Visualization. England: ACM Press, 2001. 4.1.2.1
[43] T%.%"%, T. and K(+.', H., “Mielog: A highly interactive visual log browser using
information visualization and statistical analysis,” in Proceedings of LISA XVI Six-
teenth Systems Administration Conference, pp. 133–144, The USENIX Association,
Nov. 2002. 2.4
[44] T%.%"%, T. and K(+.', H., “Tudumi: Information visualization system for monitoring
and auditing computer logs,” in Proceedings of Information Visualization, pp. 570–
576, July 2002. Sixth International Conference. 2.4
[45] W%0', C., Information Visualization: Perception for Design. California: Academic
Press, 2000. 1
[46] Y+), X., Y#0/+., W., L+, Y., L%..%0%8#, K., and A!%", C., “Visflowconnect: Providing
security situational awareness by visualizing network tra"c flows,” in Proceedings on
the Workshop on Information Assurance (WIA04), 2004. held in conjunction with the
23rd IEEE International Performance Computing and Communications Conference
(IPCCC 2004). 2.2
[47] $́, L., “Stealthwatch+therminator.” Available at:
http://www.lancope.com/products/; accessed 03-May-2005. 3.2.2
59
VITA
Kulsoom Abdullah received her Bachelor’s in Computer Engineering at the University of
Central Florida in 1998. She came to Georgia Institute of Technology and earned a Masters
in Electrical and Computer Engineering in 2000. She started working with Dr. John A.
Copeland as a graduate research assistant in the Communications Systems Center in 2002.
Since then she has been working there in network security research. Her areas of focus for
her PhD work are in network security visualization.
60
